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growing of crops for other than reproductive purposes,
and in an amount not to exceed that which was saved
by the first farmer for planting that year's crop on the
first farmer's holdings."19
• The 1994 amendments require that a breeder/seller use
the variety name even after the expiration of the plant
variety protection certificate except for lawn, turf, forage
grass seed, alfalfa or clover seed unless required to use a
variety name under state law.20
• The amendments clarify the law as to what constitutes
infringement. Under the act as amended, it is an
infringement, if done without the owner's authorization, to
— (1) condition a variety for purposes of propagation or (2)
stock the variety for any existing purpose that constitutes
infringement.21 However, it is not an infringement of an
owner's rights to perform any act — (1) concerning
propagating material of a protected variety that has been
marketed in the United States unless the act involves further
propagation of the variety or involves an export into a
country that does not protect such varieties of the plant
genus or species (unless the export is for final consumption)
or (2) done privately and for non commercial purposes.22
In conclusion
Although the prohibition of the practice of selling saved
seed is the most visible feature of the 1994 amendments,
other provisions will have a modest effect on the seed trade
and on the purchasers of seed subject to protection under
the Plant Variety Protection Act.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . Prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor inherited an interest in a farming
partnership and one third of the decedent’s estate. The
debtor filed a valid disclaimer of all of the inheritance one
day before filing for bankruptcy. The inherited property
passed to the debtor’s son. The Chapter 7 trustee sought to
avoid the disclaimer as a fraudulent transfer. The court held
that, under the Texas relation back doctrine, a disclaimer
causes the property to be treated as having never vested in
the disclaimant; therefore, the debtor never had an interest in
the property for bankruptcy purposes and no transfer
occurred. The court adopted the reasoning applied by In re
Atchinson, 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112
S.Ct. 178 (1991). Matter of Simpson, 36 F.3d 450 (5th
Cir. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption in a residence in which the debtor had $2,100 in
equity after two consensual liens. The property was also
subject to two judgment liens far in excess of the value of
the property. The court held that the judgment liens were
voidable only to the extent of the debtor’s equity in the
property as of the date of the petition. In re Menell, 37 F.3d
113 (3d Cir. 1994).
CONVERSION. Two days before filing for Chapter 7,
the debtors sold their automobile and applied the proceeds
on their homestead mortgage in order to increase the amount
of their homestead exemption. The trustee challenged the
pre-petition transfer as fraudulent. Under Fla. Stat. § 222.29,
a homestead exemption is barred if the exemption resulted
from asset conversions with the intent to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors. The court held that the near pre-petition
conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt assets was a
transfer with the intent to hinder or delay creditors;
therefore, the debtors’ homestead exemption was denied to
the extent of the pre-petition transfer. In re Thomas, 172
B.R. 673 (Bankr. M.D. 1994).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor was employed as a
psychotherapist and owned two horses. Although the debtor
had at one time raised crops on a portion of the land, no
farming activities had occurred for several years except for
enrollment of some of the land as CRP. No residence existed
on the land. Because the debtor did not have any other
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residence, the Bankruptcy Court granted the debtor three
acres of the land on which to build a residence. Because the
land was zoned for exclusive agricultural use, requiring 35
acres for building any residence, the court ordered the
trustee to obtain residential zoning for the three acre parcel.
The debtor argued that because the land was zoned for
agricultural use, the homestead should have been 35 acres in
size. The court held that restricting the homestead to three
acres was proper in fairness to the creditors and because the
debtor did not use the land for agricultural purposes. The
court also held that the order to apply for the change of
zoning was within the equitable powers of the court. Matter
of Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271 (7th Cir. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtors had defaulted on a
mortgage loan on their farm and the secured creditor had
obtained a foreclosure judgment in state court. Before the
foreclosure sale took place; however, the debtors filed for
Chapter 12. The creditor filed for relief from the automatic
stay, arguing that the debtors had no rights in the property
except their redemption rights. The court held that under
South Dakota law, the debtor retained the right to cure the
default until the foreclosure sale occurred; therefore, the
debtor had sufficient rights in the property to be protected by
the automatic stay. The court rejected two state court
opinions to the contrary. In re Bunke, 173 B.R. 172
(Bankr. D. S.D. 1994).
PLAN .  The debtor’s plan included payment of two
secured claims, a mortgage to be paid over 20 years and a
county tax obligation which was to be paid over the three
years of the plan. The trustee objected to the plan and sought
to extend the tax payments over a longer time to increase the
amount of disposable income available to be paid to
unsecured creditors over the life of the plan. The trustee
argued that the two secured claims should have equal
amortization periods. The court rejected this argument as not
supported by the Bankruptcy Code nor required by the
circumstances. The court noted that the tax obligation was
nonvoluntary and the delay in payment would harm third
parties, other taxpayers and government agencies, who did
not have any say in the payment of the tax claim. The trustee
also argued that the plan was proposed in bad faith because
the three year tax payments minimized the amounts paid to
unsecured creditors. The court held that the plan was not
made in bad faith because the plan followed all statutory
requirements and the payment period was justified under the
reasons allowing a payment period different from the
mortgage claim. Matter of Fortney, 36 F.3d 701 (7th Cir.
1994).
TRUSTEE FEES. The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan
provided for payment of the trustee’s fees except where
direct payments to creditors were made.  The plan also
provided that the debtor would make all disbursements
under the plan except for payments required to be made by
the trustee. The trustee argued that the trustee fee was
required to be paid on all payments under the plan on
impaired claims, even those directly paid by the debtors.
The debtors argued that the plan allowed direct payment of
impaired claims; therefore, no fee was due for these direct
payments. The Bankruptcy Court held that under Section
586, payments on impaired claims are made under the plan
and require payment of the trustee’s fee. The District Court
reversed, holding that where the confirmed plan provided
for direct payments to secured creditors without payment of
trustee’s fees, no payment of trustee’s fees was required.
The appellate court affirmed. In re Wagner, 36 F.3d 723
(8th Cir. 1994), aff’g, 159 B.R. 268 (D. N.D. 1993), rev’g,
150 B.R. 753 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS had filed and perfected
a tax lien against the debtor pre-petition. The debtor
received a discharge in a Chapter 7 no-asset case and filed a
post-discharge motion to avoid the tax lien as a preference.
The court held that, under Section 547(c)(6), because the tax
lien was not avoidable under Section 545 as a perfected
statutory lien, the tax lien was not avoidable under Section
547(b) as a preference. In re Wiles, 173 B.R. 92 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1994).
CLAIMS. The IRS filed a timely claim for taxes, listing
each item as estimated. Over one year later and after the bar
date for claims, the IRS amended the claim, increasing the
amount of the claim by $300,000. The Bankruptcy Court
denied the increase in the claim because the IRS gave no
reason for the delay and the trustee and creditors had relied
on the original IRS claim in lengthy and expensive litigation
which would not have occurred if the amount of the original
claim had been closer to the amended claim. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the amendment was allowable
because the original claim was labeled as an estimate and
the IRS filed the amendment as quickly as possible after
receiving the completed tax returns involved. In re Tanaka
Bros. Farms, Inc., 36 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1994), rev’g
unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g, 150 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1993).
The IRS filed a claim for taxes in the case but when the
trustee learned that the claim was only estimated and that the
actual claim amount was different, the trustee filed an
objection to the filed claim. The IRS failed to respond to the
objection and the court disallowed the claim. The IRS
argued that disallowing the claim amounted to a default
judgment in violation of Fed. Rule 55 because the trustee
failed to produce any evidence. The court held that the claim
was properly disallowed because disallowance was not a
default judgment. In re Davis, 173 B.R. 124 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtors had filed a previous Chapter
13 case which was open during the tax years 1985 through
1989. The debtors filed a second case and the IRS filed a
claim for taxes due from 1985 through 1989. The debtors
argued that the taxes were dischargeable because due more
than three years before the filing of the current case.
Although the court noted that the Bankruptcy Code has no
specific provision tolling the three year period for
dischargeable taxes, the court held that it had the power
under Section 105 to rule that the three year period was
tolled during the first bankruptcy case because the IRS was
prevented by the automatic stay from collecting the taxes.
Solito v. U.S., 172 B.R. 837 (W.D. La. 1994).
The debtors filed for Chapter 13 with a plan which
provided for payment of all priority taxes but did not
provide for any payments on secured tax claims. The IRS
filed one claim for priority taxes and one secured claim for
taxes.  The debtors did not object to the IRS claims and the
IRS did not object to the plan. The court held that the IRS
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claims in excess of the plan tax payments were discharged
but that the lien securing the remaining taxes survived the
bankruptcy case. The court rejected a petition by the debtors
to value the IRS secured claim, holding that the time for
such valuation was during the bankruptcy case before the
confirmation of the plan. In re Kuebler, 172 B.R. 595 (E.D.
Ark. 1994), aff’g, 156 B.R. 1012 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).
PLAN. At the confirmation hearing, the IRS agreed to
confirmation of the plan which included the following
provisions: (1) the debtors were to file income tax returns
for 1984-1986, (2) after the filings, the IRS had 90 days to
file additional claims for those years, and (3) after additional
claims were filed, the debtors had 180 days to file objections
to the claims. The plan was confirmed and the debtors filed
their 1984-86 returns. The IRS filed a claim for no tax due
for 1984-86.  Two and one-half years later, the IRS assessed
the debtors $110,000 for 1984-86 and filed a Notice of
Intent to Levy for the taxes plus penalties and interest. The
debtors sought an injunction against the levy. The IRS
argued that because the taxes were nondischargeable, the
confirmed plan was not binding and that any injunction was
prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. The court held that
the IRS was bound by its agreement and the confirmed plan
and that the IRS could be enjoined from violating that
agreement because the IRS had voluntarily entered the
agreement and a breach of the agreement would interfere
with the orderly administration of the bankruptcy estate. An
appeal was dismissed because the IRS later obtained
summary judgment allowing the claims. In re Martin, 172
B.R. 644 (S.D. Cal. 1994), app. dismissed, 150 B.R. 43
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993).
CONTRACTS
BREACH. The defendant had contracted to obtain
cucumbers for a pickle producer. The defendant in turn
contracted with the plaintiffs to purchase pickles for the
defendant. The defendant agreed to supply the necessary
equipment for a pickle shed and to pay the plaintiffs 50
cents commission per bushel of pickles purchased. The
agreement was only for 1989 but the defendant accepted
cucumbers from the plaintiffs from the spring 1990 crop.
Although the contract did not mention that the plaintiffs
would be growing any of the cucumbers, the plaintiffs grew
seed supplied by the pickle producer and included the grown
cucumbers in the ones sold to the defendant. Because the
spring 1990 crop was so large, the defendant informed the
plaintiffs in July 1990 that no cucumbers would be
purchased from the Fall 1990 crop. In February 1991, the
defendant informed the plaintiffs that no additional
cucumbers would be purchased from the plaintiffs and the
pickle producer removed its equipment from the plaintiffs’
farm. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant breached an
implied contract for cucumbers for the Fall 1990 and 1991
seasons based on the defendant’s failure to give timely
notice that no cucumbers would be purchased and the failure
of the defendant to remove the equipment until February
1991. The plaintiffs argued that the industry practice was
that if notice is not given in a reasonable time before the
crop season, a contract for cucumbers continued for the
same period. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to
provide sufficient evidence of such industry practice and
that because the contract involved only the plaintiffs’
purchase of cucumbers for the defendant, no breach of the
contract could occur from the failure of the defendant to
purchase cucumbers grown by the plaintiffs. Love v.
Gamble, 448 S.E. 2d 876 (S.C. App. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].* The
plaintiffs owned two ranches, a homestead and a second
ranch. The homestead was paid for and the second ranch
was subject to only a small liability. The plaintiffs purchased
a third ranch by borrowing money from the FCB of
Spokane. Because the purchase price exceeded the appraised
value of the new ranch, the FCB took a mortgage on the
second and third ranches with the loan amount being 59
percent of the value of the two properties. The plaintiffs
testified that the FCB loan officer assured them that the
homestead would not be endangered by the mortgage and
that if the plaintiffs had trouble paying the loan, the FCB
would take the two properties in full satisfaction of the loan.
The mortgage incorporated the Farm Credit Act of 1971 and
any amendments into the loan contract, including the FCB’s
rights of foreclosure. The value of the ranches declined
substantially and the plaintiffs defaulted on the loan. The
plaintiffs offered the deeds to the two ranches but the FCB
declined to accept the deeds. The FCB sent the plaintiffs
notice of their rights to apply for debt restructuring but
denied their application. The plaintiffs sued the FCB for
breach of contract arguing that the denial of the restructuring
application violated the amended Farm Credit Act and that
the FCB had breached its promise not to seek any deficiency
beyond foreclosure against the two ranches. The FCB
argued that no private right of action was allowed to enforce
the provisions of the Farm Credit Act and that no oral
evidence of any promise could be used because the written
loan agreement constituted the entire agreement. The court
held that where the Farm Credit Act was made a part of the
loan agreement, a violation of the Act’s terms could be
enforced in a breach of contract action. The court also held
that such a breach would be an affirmative defense to a
foreclosure action by the FCB. The court also held that the
oral representations of the loan officer could support an
affirmative defense of equitable estoppel to the foreclosure
action.  The case was submitted to the court for supervisory
control to establish the legal issues in the case prior to trial.
State v. District Court of the Third Jud. Dist., 881 P.2d
594 (Mont. 1994).
FEDERAL SEED ACT. The AMS has adopted as final
regulations amending the Federal Seed Act regulations,
primarily to change the common and botanical names of
several agricultural and vegetable seeds and to update the
standards for seeds. 59 Fed. Reg. 64486 (Dec. 14, 1994).
MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM §
3.04.* The plaintiffs were migrant agricultural workers who
were hired by the defendant farm labor contractor. The
plaintiffs were hired in El Paso, Texas and bused more than
two hours to the fields where the plaintiffs picked chili
peppers. Because the plaintiffs wanted an earlier pickup
time, the plaintiffs arrived at the field before sunrise and had
to wait about an hour each day before picking could start. At
the end of the day, the defendant cashed the farmer’s check,
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counted the plaintiffs’ tally of pepper cartons and paid the
plaintiffs. The ride back to El Paso took another two hours.
The plaintiffs sought compensation for the travel times and
the waiting periods at the beginning and ending of the day.
The court held that the travel times were not compensable
because the workers could choose where to live and did not
have to use the defendant’s transportation. The court
remanded the case, however, on the issue of whether the
waiting periods were compensable because the trial court
did not make specific rulings on why it had determined that
the waiting periods were compensable. The appellate court
held that if the waiting periods were incurred for the benefit
of the defendant, then the plaintiffs should have received
compensation for the periods; however, if the waiting
periods were necessitated by the number of employees or
the employees own requests, the periods were
noncompensable. Vega v. Gasper, 36 F.3d 417 (5th Cir.
1994).
The plaintiff was a migrant farm worker who asked an
employee of the defendant tomato farm and cannery whether
the defendant needed any workers. The employee consulted
with the defendant and informed the plaintiff that work was
available. The plaintiff was hired by the defendant and the
plaintiff sued for violations of the MSAWPA. The defendant
did not challenge the violations but argued that the
defendant was exempt from the MSAWPA because the
defendant was a family farm which did its own farm labor
contracting. The defendant obtained farm labor through
three methods: (1) borrowing of workers from neighboring
farms, (2) referrals from the state employment agency, and
(3) word-of-mouth referrals from existing employees, as was
done with the plaintiff. The court held that the borrowing of
employees did not amount to farm labor contracting by
nonfamily members because the test involved only how the
defendant obtained the workers for the defendant’s farm.
Second, the court held that the referrals from the state
employment agency did not amount to third party labor
contracting because the state agency did not contract with
the defendant for the employment recruiting. The court held
that the defendant’s employee performed labor contracting
because the employment negotiations were conducted
through the employee without any personal contact by the
defendant; therefore, the defendant was not eligible for the
family farm exemption from the MSAWPA. Flores v. Rios,
36 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1994).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.*  The EPA has issued
proposed regulations governing the regulation under FIFRA
of plant-produced pesticides used in the host plant. Several
plant pesticides remain exempt from FIFRA regulation,
including plant pesticides in which (1) the genetic material
that encodes for a pesticidal substance is derived from plants
that are sexually compatible  with the recipient plan and has
not been derived from a plant which is not sexually
compatible with the recipient plan; (2) the pesticidal
substance acts by inhibiting a pest from attaching to the
plant, penetrating the plant or invading the plants tissue, or
(3) the pesticidal substance is a coat protein from a plant
virus. 59 Fed. Reg. 60519 (Nov. 23, 1994), adding 40
C.F.R. Part 174.
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final the
designation of Louisiana as an accredited-free state. 59 Fed.
Reg. 60551 (Nov. 25, 1994).
WETLANDS RESERVE. The Farm Service Agency
has adopted as final regulations implementing the Wetlands
Reserve Program and changing the name of the Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service to the Farm Service
Agency. 59 Fed. Reg. 60297 (Nov. 23, 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The decedent’s
estate claimed a deduction for an executor’s fee of $100,000
based on an estimate of 1,000 hours of work at $100 per
hour. The executor maintained no records of the work
performed; therefore, the court accepted the IRS
determination of $26,000 as the allowable fee deduction.
The estate also claimed a deduction for the estimated
expenses of selling real estate which had been on the market
for four years, although the estate produced no records of
attempts to advertise the sale or any prospective buyers. The
court disallowed the selling expense deduction as too
speculative. Estate of Koss v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-
599.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* In 1929, the
decedent’s will created a trust for the decedent’s spouse with
remainders to the decedent’s three children. The children
had a general power of appointment over their remainder
interests. In 1943 one child had disclaimed a portion of the
general power of appointment such that the child retained
only the power to appoint to specific persons. The child died
without exercising the remaining power of appointment and
the trust property passed under the trust to a grandchild of
the original decedent. The grandchild filed a disclaimer of
the interest which passed under the trust by reason of the
child’s failure to exercise the power of appointment. The
IRS ruled that the child’s release of a portion of the general
power of appointment was not an exercise of the general
power of appointment because the power was created before
1942 and the release occurred before 1951. The IRS also
ruled that the release was an incomplete gift. Finally, the
IRS ruled that the grandchild’s disclaimer was effective
because the grandchild’s interest in the trust did not vest
until the child’s death. Ltr. Rul. 9447021, Aug. 22, 1994.
Within nine months after the decedent’s death, the two
residuary beneficiaries, cousins of the decedent, disclaimed
their interests in the bequest, with one disclaiming all of the
bequest and the other disclaiming a fraction of the bequest
equal to $600,000 over the value of the property that would
have passed under the decedent’s will but for the disclaimer,
as finally determined for estate tax purposes, net of all
estate, inheritance and other death taxes. The IRS ruled that
the disclaimers were effective and the disclaimed property
passed to the disclaimants’ children because the will did not
provide for alternate residuary beneficiaries. The IRS also
ruled that the decedent was of the same generation as the
cousin because the mothers of the decedent and the cousins
were sisters; therefore, the passing of the residuary bequest
to the cousins’ children was not subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9447033, Aug. 26, 1994.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent’s will in 1957 established a
testamentary trust with the decedent’s daughter as life
beneficiary with a remainder to the daughter’s child,
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contingent on the child surviving the daughter. The trust was
grandfathered as to GSTT because the trust was irrevocable
since September 1986. The child transferred the contingent
remainder to a Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT) for
the benefit of the child. The IRS ruled that the transfer of the
contingent remainder did not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr.
Rul. 9446024, Aug. 17, 1994.
An irrevocable trust was created before October 21,
1942.  The beneficiary released the power to designate the
beneficiaries of the trust and the heirs of the beneficiary also
disclaimed their interests in the trust.  The IRS ruled that the
disclaimers were not transfers subject to gift tax and would
not make the trust subject to GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9445014,
Aug. 10, 1994, clarifying Ltr. Rul. 9051012, Sept. 20,
1990.
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent was the beneficiary of
a marital trust established by the will of the decedent’s
predeceased spouse. The trust provided for distribution of
net income to the decedent and gave the trustees the power
to distribute principal for the decedent’s comfort,
maintenance, support and general well-being. The decedent
and spouse had long established the practice of giving
substantial annual gifts to family members and the decedent
continued the practice after the spouse’s death. The decedent
established an irrevocable trust for the decedent’s children
who would receive the marital trust corpus if the decedent
died without otherwise exercising a power of appointment
over the trust corpus. The marital trust trustees distributed
several shares of stock to the decedent who contributed the
stock to the irrevocable trust. The IRS argued that the
distribution of the stock was beyond the authority of the
trustees and that a state court would void the distributions.
The Tax Court held that a state court would allow the
distributions because of the decedent’s and spouse’s history
of giving gifts to family members and that the stock was
distributed to persons who would otherwise have received
the stock. Estate of Hartzell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1994-576.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent and spouse had established two inter vivos trusts
with themselves as trustees and lifetime beneficiaries. At the
death of the decedent, the surviving spouse was the sole
beneficiary and the decedent’s estate claimed a marital
deduction for the decedent’s interest in the trust which
passed to the surviving spouse. The trusts also provided that
the surviving spouse had to survive the first to die by nine
months in order to receive the decedent’s interest in the
trust.  The IRS argued that, under state law, the surviving
spouse did not have a power of appointment over trust
corpus or the power to require distribution of principal;
therefore, the surviving spouse’s interest was terminable and
not eligible for the marital deduction as QTIP. The court
held that, under state law, the trusts were revocable until
nine months after the decedent’s death and that the surviving
spouse had the power to require distribution of principal ;
therefore, the surviving spouse effectively had a power of
appointment over trust principal and the interest was QTIP.
Estate of Flake v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-573.
The decedent’s predeceased spouse’s will had
established a testamentary trust for the decedent spouse and
had claimed a QTIP marital deduction based on the value of
the decedent’s income interest in the trust. The marital
deduction was not necessary to reduce the estate tax to zero
because of ample unified credit. The decedent’s estate
argued that the marital trust property was not included in the
decedent’s estate because the predeceased spouse’s estate
marital deduction election was invalid since the election
included only the income interest which was not a fraction
or percentage share of the trust property. The IRS ruled that
although the deduction claim was based on the value of the
income interest, the estate had characterized the claim as a
percentage of the trust value; therefore, the election
substantially complied with the QTIP election requirements
and was valid. The IRS also stated that for purposes of
inclusion of the property in the decedent’s estate, the nature
of the decedent’s interest in the property was more
important as to whether the interest was included in the
decedent’s estate.  The estate also argued that because the
predeceased spouse’s estate made the election only as to the
income interest, the value of the interest on the date of the
decedent’s death was zero. The IRS ruled that the marital
deduction interest property included in the decedent’s estate
applies only to the trust property supporting the income
interest; therefore, the value of the marital trust property and
not the value of the income interest is included in the
decedent’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9446001, July 11, 1994.
VALUATION-ALM § 5.02[3][a].* The taxpayer owned
all of the issued common stock of a corporation. The
corporation amended its articles of incorporation to issue a
second class of preferred stock which (1) did not have
voting rights; (2) had dividend rights, conversion rights,
redemption rights, redemption price, and liquidation
preferences alterable by the board of directors; (3) had a
noncumulative dividend of 55 cents per share; (4) were
convertible to common stock; (5) were redeemable by the
corporation in three years or later if so determined by the
board; and (5) were subject to other terms and conditions as
approved by the board and the shareholder. The taxpayer
converted just under half of the preferred shares to common
stock and transferred the stock to the taxpayer’s two
children. The taxpayer filed a gift tax return and valued the
common stock gift at its book value. The redemption date
was extended to October 1995. The IRS ruled that the
taxpayer made a transfer of an equity interest in the
corporation while retaining an applicable retained interest;
therefore, the gift of the stock had to be valued under I.R.C.
§ 2701. In determining the value of the gift, the major issue
was the value of the preferred stock right of noncumulative
dividend of 55 cents, the right to convert to common stock
and the right to have the stock redeemed on a certain date.
The IRS ruled that the dividend right was to be valued at
zero because no election was made under Treas. Reg. §
25.2701-2(c)(2). The IRS also ruled that the conversion right
was to be valued at zero. The IRS ruled that the redemption
right was also valued at zero because the redemption date
was passed and the date was extended without the consent of
the shareholder, indicating that the corporation had an
indefinite “call” right. The IRS noted that, because the
shareholder was a director, the shareholder would be
required by the director’s fiduciary duty to continue to
extend the redemption date in order to protect the existence
of the corporation. Ltr. Rul. 9447004, July 29, 1994.
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FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The IRS has
adopted as final regulations providing that noncorporate
taxpayers must treat references to AGI as references to
regular AGI in determining all items of AMT income,
deductions or exclusions. The regulations also provide that,
in general, all I.R.C. provisions that apply in determining the
regular taxable income also apply in determining AMTI.
Treas. Reg. § 1.55-1. 59 Fed. Reg.  60556  (Nov. 25, 1994).
The taxpayer had alternative minimum taxable income
(AMTI) for 1984 as well as regular taxable income. The
1984 return included use of the 60 percent capital gain
exclusion available in 1984. In 1987, the taxpayer had
excess regular net operating losses which were carried back
to 1984 but no alternative net operating losses. The NOL
reduced the regular taxable income to zero and the
remaining NOL was used up by the 60 percent capital gains
exclusion. The taxpayer argued that because the taxpayer
received no tax benefit from the capital gains deductions, the
offset NOL reduced AMTI for 1984, under the tax benefit
rule. The court held that, under I.R.C. § 55(b), for purposes
of determining AMTI, the regular adjusted gross income
could not be reduced by regular NOL and that the tax
benefit rule did not apply because the Code expressly did
not allow AGI to be reduced by regular NOL. The court also
held that the tax benefit rule did not apply to AMT
provisions. Urbanek v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,606 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
DEDUCTIONS. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations eliminating the rule that required an employer to
deduct and withhold income tax as a prerequisite for
claiming a deduction for property transferred to an employee
in connection with the performance of services. The
proposed regulations provide guidance for substantiating a
deduction for transfers of property for services. 59 Fed.
Reg. 62370 (Dec. 5, 1994).
INFORMATION RETURNS. The IRS has adopted as
final regulation governing the reporting of prepaid interest in
the form of points paid on residential mortgages.  Recipients
of more than $600 or more of interest on a mortgage in a
calender year must report the points on Form 1098. 59 Fed.
Reg. 63248 (Dec. 8, 1994).
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* As
part of a 12 month liquidation plan, the taxpayer S
corporation sold its assets in exchange for an installment
obligation. The corporation filed its Form 1120S prior to the
due date and included all of the gain in income. The other
shareholders objected to this return and the corporation filed
an amended Form 1120S electing to report the gain in
installments. The IRS ruled that, under Haggar Co. v.
Helvering, 308 U.S. 389 (1940), the second return was
considered the “return” for purposes of the election to report
gain on the installment method; therefore, the corporation
would be allowed to report the gain on the installment
method. Ltr. Rul. 9446007, Aug. 12, 1994.
INTEREST. The taxpayers were farmers who had short-
term operating loans with a bank. The taxpayers borrowed
money from the bank to build a barn. Because of financial
difficulties, the taxpayers enrolled in the Dairy Termination
Program and planned to apply the program funds to the loan
over three years but were unable to provide enough other
funds to make the loan payments. The taxpayers settled a
foreclosure suit with the bank to pay only the DTP funds on
the loan. The taxpayers claimed the entire payment as an
interest deduction relying on language in the short-term
notes that payments were to be applied first to interest. The
court held that the interest deduction was not allowed
because the taxpayers failed to provide substantial evidence
of how the DTP payments were applied on the real estate
loan. Jacoby v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-612.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for the
period January 1, 1995 through March 31, 1995, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments remains at 8 percent and for
underpayments at 9 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations also remains at 11
percent. Note: the just-enacted GATT legislation reduces the
interest rate on overpayments above $10,000 by 1.5
percentage points. Rev. Rul. 94-78, I.R.B 1994-51.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in November
1994, the weighted average is 7.24 percent with the
permissible range of 6.52 to 7.97 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 94-101, I.R.B. 1994-48, 6.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
December 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.66 6.55 6.50 6.46
110% AFR 7.34 7.21 7.15 7.10
120% AFR 8.01 7.86 7.78 7.73
Mid-term
AFR 7.74 7.60 7.53 7.48
110% AFR 8.53 8.36 8.27 8.22
120% AFR 9.33 9.12 9.02 8.95
Long-term
AFR 8.23 8.07 7.99 7.94
110% AFR 9.08 8.88 8.78 8.72
120% AFR 9.91 9.68 9.57 9.49
SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX. The taxpayer leased a
cattle ranch on a sharecropping basis. The taxpayer did not
participate in the management or production of the cattle
raising business and did not perform any physical labor on
the ranch. The court ruled that the net earnings from the
sharecropping arrangement was not subject to self-
employment tax. Dugan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-
578.
TAX RATES. The taxable income ceilings for 1995 tax
rates are (1) 15 percent: $39,000 for married couples filing
jointly,  $31,250 for heads of households, and $23,350 for
single filers; (2) 28 percent: $94,250 for joint filers, $80,750
for heads of households, and $56,550 for single filers; (3) 31
percent: $143,600 for married couples filing jointly,
$130,800 for heads of households, and $117,950 for single
filers; (4) 36 percent: $256,500 for married couples filing
jointly,  $256,500 for heads of households, and $256,500 for
single filers; (5) 39.6 percent, all income in excess of 36
percent ceiling. The standard deductions for 1995 are $6,550
for joint filers, $5,750 for heads of households and $3,900
for single filers. The personal exemption is $2,500. The
personal exemption phases out beginning at $172,050 for
joint filers, $143,350 for heads of households and $114,700
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY
STATE OF THE ART DEFENSE. The plaintiff was
injured when the plaintiff attempted to check a combine’s
engine while the cornhead was raised and running. The
plaintiff attempted to climb over the cornhead in front of
the cab and slipped. The plaintiff sued the defendant
manufacturer of the combine in negligence for failure to
warn. The trial judge instructed the jury that if the combine
met the state of the art for design, the defendant could not
be held to be negligent. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that
the defendant had not provided sufficient evidence of the
state of the art of combine design because the plaintiff had
demonstrated that several safety measures were feasible and
available to the defendant. The defendant’s expert witnesses
from two manufacturers gave opinions against all of the
plaintiff’s suggested safety modifications, primarily on the
grounds that added protective devices would encourage
operators to place themselves in danger by attempting to
check on the machine while it was running. The court held
that the defendant had produced sufficient evidence that the
combine met the state of the art for combines at the date of
manufacture of the plaintiff’s combine. Hughes v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1994).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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